

army as mere claptrap. The true solution of the controversy was a compromise between the two systems : a combination of a well-trained militia with a nucleus of professional soldiers. A modern reader, with the example of the national armies of to-day before his eyes, can see this clearly ; Macaulay did not, though had he possessed a larger knowledge of military history he might have perceived it.

If, however, Macaulay's experience of military administration caused him to underestimate the value of the militia and to concentrate his whole attention on the standing army, at least he was led to familiarise himself with its history. He traces its development briefly but very exactly throughout the period. He proudly reminds his readers that the little army formed by Charles the Second was the germ of that great and renowned army which has, in the present century, marched triumphant into Madrid and Paris, into Canton and Candahar/¹ He notes its growth in numbers. At the close of Charles II's reign the English army numbered about 7,000 foot and 1,700 horse. It was raised by James II in 1685 to 20,000 men² and by 1688 to about 34,000.³ Under William it increased to 65,000 men in 1692, was 83,000* in 1694, and rose to 87,000 in 1697. By the disbanding which followed the peace of Ryswick it was reduced to 7,000.

This computation is but a rough one. At the close of Charles IFs reign, the forces in Ireland numbered about 10,000 and those in Scotland nearly 3,000. After the disbanding of 1698 about 12,000 men were maintained in Ireland and about 7,000 in Scotland, so that the total for the three kingdoms was about 21,000 in 1685^{and} about

*I, 284 (iii).

³ III, 1106 (ix).

*II, 664 (vi).

⁴ V, 2426-7 (xx).